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Dance and Philosophy 
 
In Pichet Klunchun and Myself (2005), Thai dancer-choreographer Pichet Klunchun and 
French choreographer Jérôme Bel sit on stage, a few meters apart, facing one another. 
Bel opens his laptop and begins to question Klunchun about who he is, what kind of 
dance he practices and the wider cultural and historical significance of the traditional 
Thai dance-drama form of khon. Klunchun answers calmly and succinctly, periodically 
rising from his chair to demonstrate movement: he embodies each of the four khon 
character types (woman, man, demon and monkey), shows a dance of the demon inciting 
the king to fight, dances the grief of a fallen warrior’s widow and teaches Bel part of 
another female dance. Throughout the first half of the show, it is Bel who asks the 
questions, sometimes querying or critically commenting on Klunchun’s verbal or danced 
responses, playing the naïve Westerner who tries and often struggles to understand a 
practice and a mindset that emerges from a context very different from that of 
contemporary France. Approximately midway through the performance, the tables turn as 
Klunchun becomes the interviewer, criticizing Bel for his reluctance to dance and acting 
similarly bemused at aspects of Bel’s art and lifestyle. Bel does in the end demonstrate 
passages from prior choreography: the moment he tries to include in all of his works 
when the performer stands still, looking directly at different members of the audience; the 
dance to David Bowie’s track “Let’s Dance” from The Show Must Go On (2001); and the 
on-stage “deaths” from both Nom donné par l’auteur (1994) and The Show, singing along 
quietly to Roberta Flack’s “Killing Me Softly” as he collapses to lie motionless on the 
ground. Across the work as a whole, the two protagonists establish a relationship of 
mutual acknowledgment and sympathy. Each addresses with humour and irony the 
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barriers to understanding the other, and there are moments of more profound emotional 
connection. But the dialogue is also sometimes tense, uncomfortable and revealing of a 
cultural chasm or fundamental inequality. Differences are highlighted and reflected upon, 
but not necessarily reconciled.  
This is not an essay about this work, which has already been analyzed insightfully 
by a number of dance scholars (for example Burt 2017; Foster 2011a, 2011b; Hardt 2011; 
Kwan 2014; Tompa 2014). Rather, I invoke it here initially as an allegorical figure of the 
relationship between dance and philosophy. These often appear as discrete, very different 
practices, distanced from, but in dialogue with, one another. Thomas DeFrantz, for 
example, describes them as ‘odd bedfellows’, urging their fundamental discontinuity: 
philosophy, he says, universalizes and ignores physicality, where dance emphasizes the 
particular (2007: 189). More recently, the title of an essay by Bojana Cvejić (‘From Odd 
Encounters to a Prospective Confluence: Dance-Philosophy’) suggests both the 
infrequency and weirdness of interactions to date, the essay itself noting ‘the difficulty in 
the rapport between the practice of dance and the abstract reflection of thought’ (2015b: 
8). The twists and turns of the conversation between dance and philosophy have (as with 
Klunchun and Bel) sometimes enabled a degree of mutual understanding, allowing both 
parties to reflect on their practices, underpinning beliefs and cultural assumptions. But the 
interaction has also generated friction. Just as some dance scholars perceive Pichet 
Klunchun and Myself as re-asserting colonialist and orientalist attitudes (Burt 2017; 
Foster 2011a; Kwan 2014), some recent writing worries about philosophy performing 
gestures of authority in interaction with performance, reaffirming the enduring uneven 
and exploitative power relation between the two (Cull 2014, Cull Ó Maoilearca 2017).  
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In what follows, I will challenge both the idea that dance and philosophy are an 
odd couple, and the perceived imperialism of philosophy in relation to dance, pushing to 
and beyond the limits of the parallel with Pichet Klunchun and Myself. My aim here is to 
map some of the numerous sites of past interaction between dance and philosophy, 
showing how they provide resources to address questions that arise or continue to arise in 
current dance practice and research (and practice-as-research). There is a long-standing 
view that philosophy has neglected dance (Levin 1977; Pouillaude 2017 [2009]1; Sheets-
Johnstone 2005; Sparshott 1988; Van Camp 2014 [1981]), which persists even though 
there is more dance philosophical literature than is typically recognized (Van Camp 1996; 
Conroy 2012). Unfortunately, this trope of neglect often combines with assertions that the 
dance-philosophy conjunction is odd, to imply that existing work is marginal, even 
insignificant (De Frantz, indeed, calls it a ‘tiny literature’). It is as if the territory of dance 
philosophical enquiry needs to be carved out afresh each time it is broached. Here, by 
contrast, I will explore how existing work might be further mined and extended, and how 
tensions between philosophical approaches might themselves provoke productive 
reflection on the premises and assumptions of dance research. I will focus selectively on 
aspects of Anglo-American and European philosophy, but this is not to claim that these 
should take priority over other traditions, nor that other European, non-Western and 
Southern traditions do not provide still further resources that speak to philosophical 
curiosity about dance. Indeed, I return below to questions around generalizability and 
positionality, not least through continued discussion of Pichet Klunchun and Myself. In 
what follows, this becomes not just an allegorical figure through which to model the 
dance-philosophy relation, but a case that illustrates the value and interest of continued 
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philosophical engagement with/in dance. This is not chapter about this work, then, so 
much as one that uses it as a springboard for curiosity about how philosophy thinks 
through dance and dance through philosophy.  
 
Philosophical Aesthetics and Philosophy as Therapy 
Pichet Klunchun and Myself, like much of Bel’s choreography, challenges 
preconceptions about what dance is and questions what can be considered to be dance. 
The work explores two rather different visions of dance as a practice, explicitly reflecting 
on the clash between them: Klunchun’s commitment to a traditional practice which 
values precision, technical control and clarity of characterization and narrative contrasts 
with Bel’s cultivated pedestrianism, anti-theatricality and refusal to represent. But, aside 
from the work’s explicit thematic, much of its stage action is quite static, involving the 
protagonists in more talking than dancing; this is highly unusual for khon, where (as 
Klunchun points out) dancers never speak, whilst Western theatre dance is also 
conventionally conceived as non-verbal. Moreover, what movement content there is in 
Pichet Klunchun and Myself is cited from the khon repertoire or from past choreography 
by Bel. So the work is not about movement originality or invention in any conventional 
sense. Indeed, the piece arguably disrupts the ontological imbrication of dance and 
movement that André Lepecki (2006) argues is central to the modern project, by 
presenting stillnesses, pauses and fragmentation of choreographic flow. Likewise, it 
seems to stage a kind of rupture in the bind between the body and movement, displacing 
and distancing what physically transpires from the act of self-expression (Cvejić 2015a). 
In challenging preconceptions about what dance is or should be, the work asks the 
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question ‘am I dance?’. Bel himself seems to answer ‘no’ (but probably with tongue-in-
cheek) when he tells Klunchun he is identified as a choreographer but is ‘not a real one’ 
because he’s not at all good at creating dances and movement. Similarly the French term 
non-danse is sometimes applied to the work of Bel and his peers (Frétard 2004). Yet what 
transpires here makes sense in relation to dance traditions and dance concerns, even as it 
may overturn some conventions. And, for all of the conversation’s apparent spontaneity 
and artlessness, this is a carefully choreographed and crafted show which relies on the 
dance expertise of both protagonists.  
What audiences think Pichet Klunchun and Myself is will affect the nature of their 
interpretation of it. And, in posing questions about its own identification, the work raises 
a wider issue of what, if anything, distinguishes dance from other practices and things. 
This is an issue addressed not just by Lepecki and Cvejć, but also in earlier philosophical 
work on dance, like the exchange between Monroe Beardsley, Noël Carroll and Sally 
Banes (Beardsley 1982; Carroll and Banes 1982; see also Davies 2011). They explore 
and develop the argument that there is nothing that intrinsically characterizes dance as 
distinct from other kinds of movement. Rather any movement can be framed as dance, 
either by a specific mode of performance (as Beardsley suggests) or by the way it is 
presented or intended to be seen by its audience (Carroll and Banes’s view). Beardsley’s 
account of dance performance as ‘superfluity of expressiveness’ is challenged by Carroll 
and Banes who comment on the ordinariness of performers’ movement in task dances 
like Yvonne Rainer’s Room Service (1963). But their insights are also relevant beyond 
that case to more recent work. Pichet Klunchun and Myself is dance not because it 
contains sequences of movement that are obviously dancing, but because of the context 
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of interpretation in which it is seen. A similar point is made by Graham McFee (1992), 
who objects to the characterization of dance as movement or as aestheticized movement. 
Neither idea is informative about the nature of dance, claims McFee, which should rather 
be thought of as action intended to be seen as dance, or under dance-art concepts.  
McFee adopts more broadly a Wittgensteinian approach to the dance concept, 
resisting the idea that a definition is needed to identify a given object as a dance, and 
acknowledging, with David Best, that ‘the demand for a definition is often in effect a 
demand for distorting oversimplicity’ (Best 1978: 19). Extending Wittgenstein’s (1958) 
discussion of games, there are no necessary and sufficient conditions for something being 
a dance: that is, no set of manifest features that all dance works share in virtue of being 
dance. Some neo-Wittgensteinian philosophers hold that definition of complex terms like 
‘art’ and ‘dance’ is logically impossible, because they are open, indefinitely extendible 
concepts (Kennick 1958; Weitz 1956): on this view, dances are identified as such thanks 
to resemblances with some other dances, but there is no central set of characteristics that 
all dances share. Alternatively, in line with a case argued by both Betty Redfern (1983) 
and McFee (1992), the intentions embodied in the making of work and its institutional 
positioning are what make something dance. So Bel and Klunchun’s intention to make 
choreography or something that speaks to a dance context makes it appropriate to 
respond to this piece as a dance work. Institutional context, then, is not just a question of 
where the work is shown, who commissions, funds and reviews it. It matters (also) that 
the work is intended to relate to, comment on or react against other things within the 
tradition of dance as an art form. 
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These writings by Best, Redfern and McFee are contexted by a wider literature 
produced at a historical moment of frequent interaction between art form specialists and 
philosophers. In the United Kingdom in the 1970s and 1980s, several philosophers 
participated in dance and dance education conferences, producing journal articles and 
books which proved influential on dance scholars (for example, Best 1974a, 1985; 
Redfern 1982 [1973], 1983).2 Much of this literature aims to rationalize and justify the 
place of dance in school and university curricula, arguing explicitly for the cognitive 
value of engagement with dance: that the practice of dance itself is thoughtful, even 
rational, and that performing, choreography and appreciation are ways of developing 
skills and intellectual as well as physical capacities difficult to acquire in other ways (see, 
for example, Best 1984b; Carr 1978, 1984a, 1984b; and Redfern 1982 [1973]). Given the 
growth of dance and dance studies within the academy since the 1980s (O’Shea 2010), it 
is tempting to assume that this battle for recognition of their intellectual interest, integrity 
and rigour is largely won. Yet recent concentration on STEM subjects in political 
discourse and education policy has eroded arts teaching in schools, and resulted in the 
denigration of subjects like dance and drama as ‘soft’, in other words as incapable of 
providing students with necessary or desirable cognitive skills (Paton 2004; Brewin 
2016). This climate also threatens dance scholarship and university dance curricula. The 
topics that exercised Best, Redfern and their colleagues, then, remain live.  
Yet changes in the philosophical orientation of dance research as a field have 
contributed to a contemporary neglect of this literature, although it speaks to a range of 
philosophical issues raised by and in recent practice. If context counts more than intrinsic 
features of movement material in identifying something as dance, for example, then this 
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connects to a broader challenge to aestheticism in which contemporary ‘conceptual’ 
choreography also participates. A work like Pichet Klunchun and Myself calls on its 
viewers to move past the aesthetic appreciation of honed bodies performing virtuosic 
movement (although the work also provides opportunities for that kind of appreciation) 
and to grasp that dance does more than merely offer a fulfilling aesthetic experience. 
Best’s analysis of the difference between aesthetic and artistic appreciation (developed by 
McFee in, for example, 2005), argues explicitly against the tradition of philosophical 
aesthetics that focuses on beauty and aesthetic judgment as key to evaluation of art. 
Artistic appreciation is not properly concerned (only) with the sensuous surface of a 
given work, but depends upon seeing the work as contextualized artistic action, related to 
existing traditions, concepts and categories of art (McFee 2005; Redfern 1983; Walton 
1970). An understanding of the context in which art practice develops and knowledge of 
the art form is essential to perception of its artistic properties. This is amply and 
humorously illustrated in Pichet Klunchun and Myself, as the dancing of both Klunchun 
and Bel acquires new properties, new significance for the viewing partner, once its 
background ideas have been made explicit. 
According to Best, Redfern and McFee, the capacity to embody meaning is a 
distinguishing feature of dance, along with the other arts, but in contrast to aesthetic 
sports such as gymnastics. Meaning is something embodied in the particular form of the 
dance in a unique way: ‘what is said about life in a work is inseparable from that 
particular work’ (Best 2004 [1982]: 168). In other words, the specific insights of Pichet 
Klunchun and Myself cannot be adequately expressed via other media (including words), 
but can only be properly grasped through experience of the work in performance. Dance 
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is no mere vehicle for messages or ideas that could be communicated otherwise. In the 
United Kingdom of the 1970s and 1980s, this concern with the specificity and non-
translatability of dance contributed to the educational rationale for its inclusion in the 
curriculum: if it could say and teach things that other arts and forms of physical education 
could not, then dance should not be excluded in favour of music or drama, nor subsumed 
into a generic ‘creative arts’ experience. But the concern also connects to much more 
recent claims about dance practice itself expressing problems rather than being a vehicle 
for communication of pre-existing ideas (Cvejić 2015a; see also below). Although the 
emphasis on medium specificity rubs against recent claims about the boundaries between 
art forms being dissolved, it does helps explain the radicalism of so-called non-danse as 
dance: it can only be understood as rejecting one vision of dance to propose another if 
understood in terms of the dance medium.  
The British literature from the 1970s and 1980s envisages philosophy playing a 
clarifying, even therapeutic, role, enabling a critical analysis of language used in relation 
to dance and exposition of the underlying assumptions of dance practice and education. 
Redfern, for example, writes of philosophy being ‘an activity of criticism and 
clarification . . . of assistance . . . in attempts to discern problems of meaning, to make 
clear what it is we are talking about, and to reveal assumptions and presuppositions 
which may underlie what we and others say’ (Redfern 1982 [1973]: ix).3 From a 
contemporary perspective, this may seem to adopt a hierarchical or transcendent view 
that dance needs the help of philosophy or that ‘the truth of the nature of performance can 
only be revealed by philosophy from an avowed position outside of it’ (Cull 2014: 20). 
As such it contrasts with other approaches in which the philosophy is thought to emerge 
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‘from the practice’. Yet arguably, philosophical aesthetics’ focus on dance appreciation 
(its values, basis and processes within the tradition of Western art dance) acknowledges 
dance spectatorship, education and scholarship as practices too, offering a valuable 
counterpart to performer and choreographer perspectives. This is philosophical work 
which addresses wider questions of to whom dance speaks and how, questions which also 
remain live, indeed are increasingly pressing in the multifaceted, multicultural and global 
sphere in which the various forms of dance now operate.  
 
Phenomenology and the Dancer’s Voice 
Nonetheless, a contrasting focus on the embodied experience of the dancer has drawn a 
number of dance scholars (who are or were also practitioners) to phenomenology. Indeed, 
according to Ann Cooper Albright, ‘phenomenology has replaced aesthetics as the 
philosophical discourse of choice for dance studies’ (2011: 8). Phenomenology, at least 
as it is employed in dance studies, offers a way to articulate lived experience, via a first-
person descriptive method, which reveals the ways in which embodied consciousness 
actively constitutes and constructs its world. Perhaps the first-person narratives of 
Klunchun and Bel in Pichet Klunchun and Myself offer a performative analogue, 
revealing how they make sense of their own and others’ dance activity, and how they 
construct their own selves in relation to the wider worlds in which they are immersed.  
Adaptations of phenomenological philosophy to dance typically take one of two 
forms. On the one hand, phenomenology is treated as a method for first-person 
description of dance, key elements of which are the effort to suspend preconceptions and 
pre-judgments, bracketing the ‘natural attitude’ or everyday ways of apprehending the 
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world that assume its objectivity or mind-independence. This bracketing enables 
defamiliarization and fresh appraisal, like the way that the confrontation between 
Klunchun’s and Bel’s practices relativizes both. Drawing on elements of Edmund 
Husserl’s phenomenology, Maxine Sheets-Johnstone (2015 [1966]), Sondra Fraleigh 
(1987) and Susan Kozel (2007), for example, employ techniques of eidetic reduction and 
imaginative variation to reveal essential features of dance experience. But sometimes, 
instead of employing phenomenological methods, dance writing focuses on the insights 
of phenomenological philosophers such as Martin Heidegger, Jean-Paul Sartre and 
(particularly) Maurice Merleau-Ponty, elaborating the content of their claims in the dance 
context. For example, Merleau-Ponty discusses the reciprocity of the experience between 
self and other, positing an intercorporeal domain and a reversibility that helps articulate 
the connection between dancer and audience member (Carr 2013). Or Merleau-Ponty’s 
notions of perception, subjectivity and intersubjectivity are used to elucidate how 
understanding of self and other in somatic practice can foster ethical relationships 
(Rouhiainen 2008). Both arguments might be applied, for example, to Klunchun’s and 
Bel’s interactions with one another and with their audience. More broadly, 
phenomenological insights are co-opted to the project of revealing dance as a privileged 
site of corporeal existence. Here, then, philosophy is not so much therapeutic 
intervention, but an aid to disclosing and articulating something that seems already to be 
known and developed through dance practice. 
Both forms of dance phenomenology (which sometimes combine) tend to 
emphasize the intrinsic interest and value of dancing. They enable dancers to verbalize 
the rich textures of somatic experience and assert the importance of that experience for 
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theoretical discussion and research (for example, Rouhiainen 2008; Williamson 2016). 
Phenomenology provides an ‘embodied approach to the construction of meaning’ which 
allows the scholar ‘to describe concrete lived human life, without forcing it through a 
methodological framework, or reducing it to a series of inner psychic experiences or 
conceptual abstractions’, and offers researchers and students a way to ‘integrate their own 
experiences in their academic work’ (Kozel 2007: 2, 5). Likewise, Cooper-Albright 
highlights the congruity between phenomenology and dance practice in an 
autobiographical account of her relationship with this philosophical approach: ‘[m]y 
desire was not to dismiss critical theory per se, but to try and uncover the theories 
implicit in the work I was witnessing . . . I wanted to give the experience of dancing its 
own intellectual credibility’ (2011: 13). Phenomenology thus becomes a means to 
reconcile and equalize the odd couple of dance and philosophy.  
Orienting phenomenological dance scholarship around dancing and the dancer’s 
experience, rather than (say) choreography or viewing, is not inevitable. A 
phenomenology of dance appreciation or interpretation could examine the underlying 
structures of perceptual and cognitive engagement of an audience with dance (Pakes 
2011): how, for example, the viewer makes sense of the sequence of visual and auditory 
impressions offered by Pichet Klunchun and Myself, and can conceptualize this sequence 
as a single performance; or, indeed, as one iteration of a dance work, an object (unlike the 
performance event) not itself given sensuously. Likewise, as just suggested, 
phenomenology could elucidate how the embodied being of the audience member comes 
to relate to, or empathize with, that of Klunchun and Bel. But the dancing participant’s 
experience is the key focus of most phenomenological dance studies, with this 
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philosophical approach responding to the scholar’s willingness to be ‘corporeally 
saturated’ by the dancing being analyzed (Cooper-Albright 2011: 13).  
This can imply that viewing experience, insofar as it is discussed at all, should be 
immersive and kinaesthetically engaged rather than detached: Sheets-Johnstone, for 
example, suggests that the task of both dancer and audience member is sustaining the 
illusion of virtual force through pre-reflective attunement to dance motion; in the same 
way as the dancer may shatter that illusion by reflecting on what she is doing, becoming 
aware of individual movements and the process of their execution, so the audience can 
break the continuity, ‘interrupt the flow and fragmentize [the phenomenon’s] inherent 
totality such that “lived experience” is not achieved’ (2015 [1966]: 30-31). These ideas 
seem more relevant to immersive or illusionistic dances than conceptual choreography in 
the mould of Pichet Klunchun and Myself, whose ironic mode and political discomfiture 
(quite deliberately) disrupts the dancers’ and audience’s absorption in it. Indeed Sheets-
Johnstone herself acknowledges (2015: xxxii) the basis of her early work in historical 
modern dance rather than postmodern practice that eschewed symbolic illusion and 
formal continuity. Yet these sorts of phenomenological formulations tend to render the 
very notion of ‘lived experience’ normatively value laden. The term comes to encapsulate 
the rich field of somatic sensation that we should strive but do sometimes fail to reach. It 
is no longer merely a way to designate phenomenology’s focus on the ‘feel’ of 
experience from the inside (as distinct from, say, metaphysical or conceptual issues), 
however that changes depending on our position and the mode of givenness of the dance 
in question (Pakes 2011). Emphasis on the subject’s presence to itself in the experience 
of movement, as well as the normative and universalist tenor of (some) 
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phenomenological discourse, renders it ripe for poststructuralist critique. Developed 
through introspection, such description apparently assumes the existence of a unified 
human subject capable both of relatively unconstrained intentional action, and of 
observing and knowing itself in the process of so acting. Yet poststructuralism (especially 
the work of Jacques Derrida) offers a critique of the metaphysics of (self-)presence, 
whilst also emphasizing the historical constitution of the subject through language and 
discourse. Similarly to Klunchun and Bel, who, for all their apparent honesty, spontaneity 
and openness, are arguably transparent to neither themselves nor the audience, 
consciousness cannot reach the ideal of self-knowledge that phenomenology apparently 
promises. Indeed, Derrida’s critique seems to threaten the starting premise of 
phenomenology, also explicitly rejected by Michel Foucault, who objects to how 
phenomenology ‘gives absolute priority to the observing subject, which attributes a 
constituent role to an act, which places its own point of view at the origin of all 
historicity’ (1973: xiv; see also Ness 2011). The problem with phenomenology of dance 
in the context of postmodern and postcolonial critiques of universalism is that ‘the realm 
of subjectivity is no longer taken to furnish a ground of knowledge adequate in itself 
[since] the subject is a false universal’ (Rothfield 2005: 43). 
Philipa Rothfield articulates a common concern about phenomenology’s scope for 
differentiation of experience in terms of how it is shaped by culture, history and 
discourse. As highlighted above, an important element of phenomenological method is its 
claim to bracket or suspend presuppositions and prejudgments about the analyzed 
phenomenon. Yet critical theory tends to question the very possibility of such bracketing 
and to emphasize how one’s perspective is in large part determined by one’s inscription 
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in a particular historical moment and socio-cultural structure. As Pichet Klunchun and 
Myself reveals, the positionality of Klunchun and Bel respectively is not like a set of 
clothes that can be temporarily discarded in order for them to see themselves and the 
world differently. Rather the way each constructs the world is deeply determined by 
culture and historicity. More generally, that raises the question of whether there are any 
essences of dance to be uncovered through phenomenological enquiry, if dance 
experience is historically conditioned and socially constructed ‘all the way down’.  
However, does acknowledging cultural difference necessarily imply that 
philosophy should not aspire to generality? Arguably, the kinds of insights generated 
through phenomenology properly concern a level of enquiry that cuts through 
applications to specific cultural and historical moments (see Pakes 2011; Sheets-
Johnstone 2015). The structures phenomenology is trying to elucidate are those whereby 
Klunchun, Bel or any human consciousness can make sense of their own movement as 
their own, of themselves as continuous beings, identifying specific objectivities and other 
agents in the stream of experiences. The emphasis here, then, is not on historical or 
cultural differences but on what unites us as participants in consciousness. As such, the 
generality of phenomenology’s concerns aligns with a large number of philosophical 
topics within philosophy of mind, language, metaphysics and ethics, as well as aesthetics, 
which are essentially general issues. For example, the question of how consciousness is 
related to the physical being of humans (and other animals) is a general one, and 
solutions seem likely to be similarly general, not subject to qualification depending on 
cultural group at the metaphysical level, even if the body is experienced differently across 
various cultures and practices. Whilst it is true that the mind-body problem arises within 
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a specific cultural and philosophical tradition (and the issue looks different from, or 
simply does not arise for, other perspectives), this does not mean that the question as 
such, or the generality of its implications, dissolves. Indeed, the degree to which 
questions of cultural difference affect the premises and nature of such general enquiry is 
itself open to philosophical debate.  
 
Poststructuralism, Philosophy and Politics 
Pichet Klunchun and Myself of course engages very directly with the politics of cultural 
difference, tackling the task of intercultural performance in an unusual way: ‘it does not 
try to stitch together two disparate art forms; instead it allows these two forms to remain 
side by side – at some distance from each other’ (Kwan 2014: 191). But although SanSan 
Kwan and others (notably Foster 2011a and Burt 2017) acknowledge the humorous and 
unpretentious way in which the work tackles the theme of difference, they read the piece 
as ultimately reinforcing rather than challenging inequality and orientalism. These 
readings are enabled by conceptual frameworks with roots in poststructuralist philosophy, 
which has profoundly impacted dance and dance studies since ideas from 
(predominantly) French philosophy, literary theory and linguistics began to be absorbed 
within the field from the 1980s onwards.  
Foucault’s writing, for example, accorded the body new importance in cultural 
history, via a discussion of the disciplinary regimes and institutions that have historically 
organized the body (prisons, schools, the workplace, for example). Foucault’s concern 
with discipline and the docile body of modern Western society has proved particularly 
fertile as a way to scrutinize the kinds of subjects produced by dance training. As ‘the 
 17 
most blatant and unarguable instance of the disciplined body’ (Bryson 1997: 56), the 
dancer’s embodied subjectivity is inscribed with socio-cultural as well as aesthetic 
values, through daily participation in technique classes in particular. Drawing on 
Foucauldian concepts, these processes of body construction have been analyzed in a 
range of dance contexts (see, for example, Foster 1997 and Ritenburg 2010). But they can 
also be read back off bodies in performance.4 The bodies of both Klunchun and Bel, for 
example, inscribe social, cultural, historical and colonial values in contrasting ways and 
the protagonists also explicate that difference through verbal accounts of their training 
histories. In contrast to Klunchun whose litheness, flexibility and superlative technical 
control is very visible in his performance, Bel adopts a resolutely anti-technical, 
pedestrian physical persona throughout the performance, even when dancing: the quiet 
internalized focus and resolutely unshowy dance to David Bowie’s “Let’s Dance” is that 
of someone dancing only for their own enjoyment in a disco or club, for example. Yet 
Susan Foster suggests that Bel’s ‘arduous cultivation of the pedestrian’ is itself a form of 
bodily discipline, here employed in the service of a wider artistic project: ‘[t]he labor 
[Bel] puts into fashioning a body that appears to reside outside the boundaries of 
representation must go unacknowledged in order for the claim that his movement exists 
outside of representation to be persuasive’ (2011a: 201). That claim, on Foster’s reading, 
is the mechanism whereby Bel ultimately asserts the superiority of his Western avant-
garde experimentalism over Klunchun’s commitment to Thai tradition, ‘reinvigorat[ing] 
the first world’s heritage of privilege based in colonial histories and the stereotypes that 
enable colonization’ (Foster 2011a: 202-3; see also Burt 2017). 
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These interpretations of Pichet Klunchun and Myself exemplify how applications 
of poststructuralist philosophy politicize dance discourse and analysis. Poststructuralism 
also re-reads philosophy itself in Nietzschean terms of relations of power. Derrida’s 
attack on logocentrism, or the dominance of the (spoken) word in conceptualizations of 
thought and reason in the history of Western philosophy, particularly post-Enlightenment, 
continues to resonate in dance, as does his critique of the binary oppositions dominating 
‘traditional’ philosophy. Derrida and others (for example, Said 2003 [1978]; Grosz 1994) 
argue that one term of any binary is always privileged over the other term, which is 
subordinated and repressed; thus philosophy’s perceived privileging of mind over body, 
speech over writing, language over embodiment, male over female, is treated as a 
historical phenomenon ripe for challenge. At the macro-level, this helps carve out a place 
for dance within the academic landscape from which it was (in the West) traditionally 
excluded. At the micro-level, identifying and critiquing binaries becomes one process of 
dance analysis, evident in Foster’s discussion of Pichet Klunchun and Myself: ‘[t]acitly 
invoking the distinction between “traditional” and “experimental” conceptions of 
choreography’, she claims, the dialogue in this work ‘reaffirms and reinvigorates 
hierarchies of civilization implemented in Europe’s colonization of the world’ and 
rehearses also gender divisions; ‘tradition is aligned with the feminine and 
experimentation with the masculine, thereby securing for Bel a masculine dominance and 
superiority in the world of dance’ (2011a: 197). For Ramsay Burt, similarly, ‘the 
difference between East and West in Pichet Klunchun and Myself rehearses and 
reinforces a binary trope that is ideologically created within Orientalist discourse’ in the 
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sense that ‘Klunchun is made to carry the burden of representing the exotic oriental other’ 
(2017: 154).  
Foster’s reading of Pichet Klunchun and Myself itself is arguably in a lineage of 
textual analyses of dances which become possible with the development of 
poststructuralist dance theory (Foster 1986; Franko 1993; Goellner and Murphy 1995; 
Pakes 2001). Drawing on the work of Derrida and Roland Barthes, writers like Foster 
(1986) and Janet Adshead-Lansdale (1999) treat dances as texts, opening them to scrutiny 
in terms of meanings beyond the artist’s horizon. Barthes’ essay ‘The Death of the 
Author’ (and its companion piece ‘From Work to Text’) is one source of a widespread 
avowed anti-intentionalism in dance theory,5 which implies either greater creativity on 
the part of the spectator or a greater susceptibility of her interpretations to commitments 
born of a particular historical, socio-cultural and theoretical position. The textual analysis 
of dance, then, also links with increasing critical attention to the positioning of the viewer 
and with the critique of dance representation in which analyses like those of Pichet 
Klunchun and Myself, discussed above, participate. And the idea of dance as text also 
implies a political critique of the notion of the artist as author, controlling consciousness 
or genius, a notion inherited from the modern Western tradition of thinking about art. 
That notion has come under increasing attack in dance practice and writing that wants to 
overturn the regime of control and ownership with which authorship is typically 
associated (see, for example, Bel’s Xavier Le Roy 2000; Cvejić 2015a; Lepecki 2006 and 
2010). One issue of contention in the analyses of Pichet Klunchun and Myself, for 
instance, is the way its title, in first person mode, positions Bel as creator, despite the 
dialogic nature of the dance (Kwan 2014) and ‘presupposes [Bel’s] privileged vantage 
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point’ (Burt 2017: 152). Foster is similarly critical of Bel’s underlying commitment to ‘a 
conception of dance as a single-authored creation that attempts to present a unique vision 
to its viewers’ (Foster 2011a: 203).  
A valuable lesson of the poststructuralist ‘theoretical revolution’ has been the 
importance of a more profoundly reflexive engagement with one’s position as a 
researcher: the need to recognize and acknowledge that writing on dance, like any other 
form of research, always comes from a particular perspective which inevitably influences 
the conclusions drawn. These insights may not be unique to critical theory: they are also 
developed in dance anthropology and ethnography as well as other domains of 
philosophy, for example Nagel (1989). But the positive ethical significance of a concern 
with ‘positionality’ is clear. It is anti-exclusionary, politically astute in its attitudes to 
knowledge production, and seeks in some way to acknowledge and redress the wrongs of 
colonialist, patriarchal and postcolonial oppression. There remain genuine philosophical 
questions about the extent to which the substance of a philosophical argument is or is not 
determined by the philosopher’s ethnicity, gender or sexuality, however, and about the 
extent to which perceptions, conceptual frameworks and values might be shared, not only 
across individuals but also across cultural groups.  
Perhaps because of a lack of critical engagement with certain tenets of 
poststructuralist thought, dance studies seems to date to have largely avoided these 
general questions. Sally Ann Ness comments on the absorption of Foucault’s work within 
dance studies, noting an ‘absence of any heated, dance-centred critical response to at least 
the early Foucault’ (2011: 21). There is arguably a comparable lack of critical 
contestation of other poststructuralist concepts too: that Western thought is logocentric, 
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that binaries inevitably repress one of their terms, that the author is dead, that the modern 
subject or self is a historical construct constituted by the discourses of bourgeois 
capitalism and (latterly) neoliberalism. Yet all of these claims might be disputed, and in 
various ways. Arguments from philosophical authority remain prevalent in some dance 
theoretical writing and militate against its development as critical philosophy: as Jon 
Erickson puts it, ‘the magic of invoking a relatively small number of the right names 
interminably repeated, with minor variations’ (2001, 145). The radical critical dimension 
of poststructuralist theory has tended to get diluted as it has entered the mainstream, also 
arguably isolating philosophical discussion in dance from debates within other kinds of 
philosophy (even whilst it aligns dance studies more squarely with literary, cultural and 
performance studies which share a poststructuralist framework). There remains a 
significant disconnect, not to say antagonism, between these fields and much work that 
finds its disciplinary home in philosophy (even those quarters of the discipline focused 
mainly on ‘continental’ philosophy).  
 
Analytic Engagements 
A case in point would be the lack of sustained dialogue between poststructuralist dance 
theory and analytic philosophy on questions of ontology and identity. Dance is unlike 
some other art forms (painting or carved sculpture, for example) in not (typically) 
producing works that are (or are embodied in) physical objects. Rather, it (typically) 
generates performance events. But although some performances are one-off, others are 
grouped with similar events as performances of a given dance or dance work: the 
apparently spontaneous dialogue of Pichet Klunchun and Myself has been performed over 
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a hundred times in numerous different venues (Kwan 2014). So what is Pichet Klunchun 
and Myself when conceived as this repeatable work, rather than as a performance event? 
Having never seen the work live, I am relying on a video recording of one performance to 
make claims about it. Am I then talking about the same thing as Foster, Burt and Kwan 
(for example)? And does the work depend on documentation not just for its analysis but 
in order to continue to exist as a work? Is this work archived in the bodies of its 
protagonists even if all recordings are destroyed? These sorts of questions are raised by 
dance and performance scholars interested in ephemerality, disappearance and the body 
as archive (Lepecki 2010; Phelan 1993; Reason 2006). But they have also been 
extensively debated within analytic philosophy of dance, but without much explicit 
interaction between these two traditions of scholarship.  
Some analytic philosophy examines the relationship between work and score, 
both expounding and critiquing the view that notation (of various kinds) in some way 
anchors performance identity (Blades 2013; Conroy 2013; Goodman 1976; McFee 1992 
and 2011; Pakes forthcoming; Pouillaude 2017 [2009]).6 The kind of thing a dance work 
is, its ontological category, has also been debated: the view that the dance work is an 
abstract object or type, manifest in multiple possible performance tokens, in particular 
has been extensively discussed (Davies 2011; McFee 1992 and 2011; Pakes 2013 and 
forthcoming). Other ways to understand the dance work as a perduring (Alpert 2016; 
Conroy 2016) or fictional (Pakes 2016) entity have also received some attention, whilst 
analytic discussion of restaging and reconstruction (Conroy 2009; Pakes 2017) connects 
up with debates about reconstruction and re-enactment in dance studies (Franko 1993 and 
2017; Lepecki 2010; Midgelow 2007). Yet conflict between philosophical traditions 
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surfaces even at the level of the language used to frame the issues. The very ideas of 
repeatability and identity, central to analytic discussion, are questioned by 
poststructuralist dance scholars keen to emphasize difference, displacement and 
reinvention in the re-enactment of past dance. Yet interest in repeatability, from an 
analytic perspective, does not signify an uncritical insistence on sameness across 
performances (Pakes 2017): all philosophers writing on this issue explore (often 
celebrate) performance variation, even whilst some focus on the challenge of explaining 
what remains the same. And that challenge remains pressing, given its centrality to 
debates about copyright (Gover 2016; Van Camp 2006, 2014 [1981]) and to issues 
around dancer co-authorship (Bresnahan 2014 and 2016; McFee 2011 and 2013).  
As suggested earlier, increasing dominance of phenomenology and 
poststructuralism within the dance studies field has perhaps militated against engagement 
with other perspectives, despite the recent growth in analytic philosophy of dance.7 This 
is partly because the concerns of dance studies have shifted towards themes that other 
traditions seem better placed to tackle (embodiment, for example, or dancer experience 
‘from the inside’). But it may also indicate antipathy to the mode and focus of analytic 
literature, which tends not to routinely historicize arguments and which may focus 
elsewhere than on the socio-political and ideological implications of dance practice. An 
analytic philosophical approach is not intrinsically inimical to either history or politics, 
however. Political philosophy and ethics remain prominent within the philosophy 
curriculum more broadly, and some have drawn on arguments in those domains to 
discuss choreography: for example, to address the question of whether choreographers 
should be making political dance (Mullis 2015).  
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Many of the questions posed by analytic philosophy of art are normative in this 
sense: that is, they are questions about how dance should be made, appreciated, and 
understood, which might be misunderstood as authoritarian attempts by philosophers to 
tell dance practitioners and viewers what to do. But many ethical questions about dance 
have an unavoidably normative slant, for example, should the value of a dance work be 
judged (partly or wholly) on the basis of its moral or political content? The critiques of 
Pichet Klunchun and Myself explored above argue that this work fails to assert the 
equality of its protagonists, or worse, that it reinforces colonial oppression and hierarchy, 
even as it pretends to even-handedness. Does this imply that the work would be better if 
it adopted a different approach to presenting the cultural contrast between Klunchun and 
Bel? Better in what sense? Both Foster and Burt compare and contrast this work with 
others (Klunchun’s About Khon and I Am a Demon, as well as Akram Khan’s Zero 
Degrees), judged more satisfactory than the orientalist Pichet Klunchun and Myself. But 
does moral and artistic value coincide here, and in other cases? The analytic 
philosophical literature explores arguments for and against various possible answers to 
this question. Ethicists (for example, Gaut 1998) maintain that ethical flaws are 
necessarily aesthetic flaws: Pichet Klunchun and Myself is worse as dance because it 
upholds inequality. Autonomism (for example, Anderson and Dean 1998; Bell 1969) 
accepts that a work can be morally troubling without its artistic value necessarily being 
affected: Pichet Klunchun and Myself may be morally objectionable yet still effective 
choreography. Cognitive immoralism (Kieran 2002) by contrast acknowledges that works 
may encourage audiences to endorse morally problematic views (for example, revelling 
in Bel’s amusingly cavalier approach or assertion of colonialist superiority), but argues 
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that this ultimately enhances the work’s value because it helps viewers better understand 
the moral issues at stake. Such debates enable engagement with ethical issues raised by 
dance but also reflection on the commitments of contemporary ideological dance critique. 
Much hinges, in interpretation and assessment of Pichet Klunchun and Myself, on 
the extent to which Bel is understood to be ironizing his own position. Is his stage 
persona deliberately condescending in order to point up the dynamics of Western 
colonialist ideologies? Is he aware of how he appears to position Klunchun here? Is 
Klunchun ironically and consciously playing along with the role he is accorded? What 
were the dynamics of their creative collaboration in planning, and repeated performance 
of, this work? How we answer such questions seems crucial to interpreting the work’s 
political significance. But this implies that the artistic intentions here (either what 
Klunchun and Bel thought they were doing or the viewer’s hypotheses about that) makes 
a difference to the work’s meaning. Challenging the received view that the author is dead, 
continuing debates within analytic philosophy about the relation between intention and 
meaning allow the premises of interpretation here to be interrogated: they explore, for 
example, the relative merits of actual intentionalism, hypothetical intentionalism and anti-
intentionalism (Iseminger 1992 and 1996; McFee 2011). If we want to hold Bel 
responsible for expressing morally and politically problematic attitudes through this 
work, then we need to read the work both as his, and as conveying a particular range of 
meanings, even propositions, about postcoloniality. But the question of whether messages 
conveyed by the dance should be evaluated in terms of their truth or moral probity 
remains open to debate.  
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Dance as Philosophy 
Indeed, one might argue that the issue is already being debated in Pichet Klunchun and 
Myself. This piece expresses a range of attitudes towards East-West relations and 
provokes its audiences to consider the dynamics of the postcolonial, global world, and 
their impact upon the practice of dance. So perhaps the work itself is doing philosophy, 
simultaneously raising and thinking through a series of metaphysical and ethical 
questions. As such, it would participate in a general movement towards acknowledging 
performance itself as a philosophical practice, evident via the ‘emerging field’ of 
‘Performance Philosophy’ (Cull 2014). This field has affinities with philosophical work 
elsewhere: for example, philosopher of mind Alva Noë (2015) considering dance as 
organizational activity, and choreography as a reorganizational practice of the same 
species as philosophy itself; and the numerous philosophical discussions of dance as a 
thinking or knowledge-generative practice (for example, Boyce 2013; Montero 2016; 
Pakes 2003, 2004 and 2009), some linked to the development within dance scholarship of 
practice-as-research. Performance Philosophy pertains to performance in general, but 
there are parallel developments in dance philosophy specifically. Claire Colebrook 
(2005: 5), following Gilles Deleuze, proposes that the dancing body itself provides a 
means to re-think the real and its relation to potentiality and actuality, in what she calls ‘a 
real philosophy of dance or, more appropriately, a dancerly philosophy’. And Cvejić, 
(2015a and 2015b) identifies recent European choreography (the work of Xavier Le Roy, 
Jonathan Burrows, Eszter Salamon, Boris Charmatz and Mette Ingvartsen) as an 
encounter between dance and philosophy ‘which perhaps comes the closest to 
performance philosophy as its particular “dance-variant”’ (2015b: 16). Although she does 
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not discuss Bel, his practice has many affinities with these other artists; its philosophical 
dimension is examined by, for example, Lepecki (2006) and Protopapa (2013). 
The term Performance Philosophy expresses a deliberate refusal to specify in 
advance the relationship between the two terms: at least in Laura Cull’s formulation, 
there is no hyphen nor any link-word (‘as’, ‘of” or ‘and’) between the nouns, in an effort 
to ‘unsettle the identities’ of the concepts they denote (Cull 2014: 20). Bolstered by 
arguments that philosophy cannot continue to be written in traditional ways (Badiou 
2008; Cull 2014; Cull Ó Maoilearca 2017; Deleuze 2004 [1968]), Performance 
Philosophy is conceived in ‘immanent’ rather than ‘transcendent’ mode. For Cull, 
‘philosophy of dance’ (alongside other ‘philosophies of x’) is typically transcendent, 
tending ‘to reproduce hierarchical structures of thought and knowledge, [implicitly 
maintaining] that the truth of the nature of performance [or dance] can only be revealed 
by philosophy from an avowed position outside of it’ (2014: 20). Philosophy, she 
suggests, is often applied to practice and uses dance examples merely to illustrate and 
reinforce ideas already mapped out conceptually in advance: the way I used Pichet 
Klunchun and Myself earlier to exemplify Foucauldian ideas about bodily discipline or 
phenomenological accounts of intersubjectivity perhaps furnishes useful illustration. 
What gets missed when philosophy is thus applied, according to Cull, is the performance 
as a ‘source of philosophical insight in itself’ which challenges our very idea of what it is 
or means to do philosophy (2014: 24). Likewise, Cvejić is interested in dance-philosophy 
(hyphenated in her formulation) as immanence, ‘a vertigo that ceaselessly produces 
processes that interfere in one another, processes of thought, sensibility, imagination, 
physical movement, attention and so on, as opposed to the hierarchy of philosophical 
 28 
thought transcending dance’ (2015b: 16). Pichet Klunchun and Myself, on this view, has 
the capacity to trouble, disrupt and reinvent philosophical thinking, exploding the 
philosophical parameters applied to it.  
Cvejić’s (2015b) essay presents the development of the conversation between 
dance and philosophy as a narrative of progress. She charts how that conversation moves 
gradually through a series of stages to the contemporary ‘paradigm shift’ of dance-
philosophy: from the tendency of philosophers (exemplified by analytic philosophers, 
Cvejić claims, as well as modern dance theorists) to offer essentialist definitions of 
dance;8 to the development of structuralist and poststructuralist-influenced readings of 
choreography; to recognition of the limitations of such readings and a moment when 
philosophical writing itself become a resource for dance makers; to, finally, the 
contemporary moment of dance philosophy, where the practice of the same set of dance 
makers is understood as itself intervening philosophically through performance. Selected 
contemporary works are analyzed as ‘choreographing problems’, in the Deleuzian sense, 
disrupting the relation between movement, body and subjectivity that (she argues) is 
conventionally assumed in dance. Cvejić’s ideas are relevant also to Pichet Klunchun and 
Myself, as suggested earlier, insofar as its citational mode, episodic structure and ironic 
displacement of its protagonists’ perspectives rupture the smooth surface of dance 
representation and supposedly authentic self-expression. But the narrative of progress, 
which frames Cvejić’s discussion of specific works, suggests that these cases have wider 
ramifications for how the artists and their audiences will be able to understand their 
activities in the future (see also Lepecki 2006 and 2016). 
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The vision of ‘traditional’ philosophy that emerges from both Cull’s and Cvejić’s 
writings is of a detached, authoritarian practice existing ‘outside’ dance. They object to 
both uncritical application of philosophical concepts in dance interpretation, and to the 
tendency of some philosophy to treat dance merely as metaphor, ignoring its empirical 
practice (see also Pouillaude 2017 [2009]). Also, some philosophers neglect actual 
practices and works in favour of discussing literary or cinematic treatments of dance. In 
all such cases, dance appears as ‘nothing more than the instrument of a philosophical 
exercise’ (Cvejić 2015b: 14). This critique of ‘transcendent’ approaches is valuable in 
raising the question of the proper relation between dance and philosophy, and in 
challenging the assumption that the two domains are at odds and difficult to bridge. Yet it 
risks misrepresenting other interactions between dance and philosophy as dominated by 
‘transcendence’ and effectively superseded by Performance Philosophy or dance-
philosophy. As I have explored in this chapter, however, different philosophical traditions 
(phenomenological, poststructuralist, analytic, and so on) offer resources to tackle 
different philosophical issues, which are usually questions that arise in the practice, 
conceived broadly to include viewing as well as dancing and choreography.  
To use a range of philosophical strategies and tools to answer these questions or 
clarify their stakes is not inevitably to colonize or suppress ideas coming from dance 
itself. My discussion of Pichet Klunchun and Myself from a variety of philosophical 
perspectives does not deny or over-ride any philosophical intervention the work itself 
arguably already makes concerning the ethics of intercultural performance and exchange. 
Indeed, those perspectives themselves assist in critically probing how Pichet Klunchun 
and Myself, or any dance, does philosophy: whether it simply raises philosophical issues 
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or can also develop arguments or a sustained position on those questions, given the 
diverse ways in which the work is interpreted and evaluated. And can what a given dance 
says philosophically be generalized beyond this particular case to other dances and their 
wider socio-historical context? Would it need to be generalizable in some way to qualify 
as philosophical insight? These are meta-issues that it is difficult, if not impossible, for 
the work itself to address; issues that require conversation between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ 
philosophical perspectives.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has explored some of the philosophical questions raised by dance, and some 
of the philosophical approaches that can help to answer them. I have sought to trace 
different types of connection between dance and philosophy, as they are evident in past 
interactions between the two domains. Philosophy functions variously as therapy, as an 
aid to articulating embodied perspectives, as a conceptual basis for critical interpretative 
practice, as a set of tools with which to think through what is puzzling about dance and as 
one mode of enquiry that performance and choreography can themselves embody. 
The chapter highlights tensions and disagreements between philosophical 
approaches, some of which are superficial, others more deep-rooted. Sometimes, despite 
different starting points, there is convergence over common themes: the relative 
importance of the aesthetic to dance value and meaning, for example, which is critically 
examined by both philosophical aesthetics and contemporary ‘conceptual’ choreography. 
At other times, conflict is more fundamental, concerning basic metaphysical or 
epistemological commitments, or the very conception of what philosophy is, can do or 
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should be: for example, the tensions between phenomenology and poststructuralism over 
the humanist subject as the locus of philosophical knowledge; or the default realism of 
most analytic philosophy in contrast to the continental tradition’s ‘theses to the effect that 
consciousness and reality are interconnected at a fundamental level’ (Cazeaux 2000: xiii); 
or, again, the Wittgensteinian notion of philosophy as therapy versus Performance 
Philosophy’s antipathy to ‘traditional’ philosophy exerting authority over, by thinking 
about, performance. But the process shows, at least, the frequency and multifariousness 
of mutual engagements between dance and philosophy, cutting through the idea that their 
encounters are odd. 
I began by invoking Pichet Klunchun and Myself as an allegorical figure of the 
dance-philosophy relation. About fifteen minutes from the end of the work, Bel 
demonstrates his slow collapse to the floor to “Killing me softly,” extracted from his 
work The Show Must Go On. The scene proves unexpectedly affecting for Klunchun, 
who explains how it reminds him of the death of his paralyzed mother. Bel comments on 
being pleased at the reaction: it chimes with his aims to allow the viewer space to reflect 
as his own authorial voice fades (‘that’s for you to think, to feel about what is your 
relation with death, because I cannot say anything, you know: this is so private, personal, 
intimate . . .’). This is a raw moment of mutual understanding and sympathy between 
Klunchun and Bel, also moving for the audience, especially as a culmination of the slow 
self-exposition and exchange of views that has occupied the rest of the conversation. Yet 
the work does not end on this note: there follows a conversation about nudity in 
performance, in which Klunchun refuses to watch Bel strip and the significance of his 
nakedness is contrasted with that of workers in Bangkok bars frequented by tourists. The 
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cultural gulf between Klunchun and Bel opens up again, as the unequal, exploitative 
relation between West and East encroaches on their encounter as individuals.  
Dance and philosophy have different disciplinary histories. Sometimes these 
converge, as I have illustrated here. Sometimes they pull apart insofar as the concerns 
dominating those disciplines are distinct from, or at odds with, one another. But dance 
and philosophy do not need to be similar in order to talk productively to one another. 
Moments of connection and self-reflective awareness can open up through the encounter 
of their differences, and because each can speak to the questions and curiosity of the 
other. 
 
NOTES 
 
1 Frédéric Pouillaude (2017 [2009]) argues that the exclusion of dance from the 
philosophical canon has become a ‘transcendental absenting’ that shapes the very 
possibility of dance being discussed philosophically on a par with other arts, and in terms 
of the categories applicable to them. Whatever this may tell us about the history of a 
particular tradition in philosophy and its image of dance, however, it does not follow that 
dance is absent from all traditions or from contemporary writing, as Pouillaude himself 
recognizes. Dance’s absence from philosophy, then, is not transcendental in the sense of 
ineluctable. 
 
2 The Perspectives series instituted by the journal Research in Dance Education in 2003 
offers a snapshot of this literature, with five of the six essays re-published in the series 
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being by philosophers: Redfern (2003 [1975] and 2007 [1982]); Best (2004 [1982]); 
Gordon Curl (2005 [1982]); and Louis Arnaud Reid (2009 [1969]). They are selected for 
republication because they are ‘either of historical interest per se, or the issues addressed 
are so fundamental they remain relevant today, even though the context of education and 
dance education may have changed with the passage of time’ (Chapman and Rolfe 2003: 
184). 
 
3 The influence of the later Wittgenstein and his therapeutic notion of philosophy is 
evident here: ‘The work of the philosopher consists in marshalling reminders for a 
particular purpose’ (Wittgenstein  1958 [1953]: §127). ‘A philosophical problem has the 
form: “I don’t know my way about,’” (Wittgenstein  1958 [1953]: §123) and the aim of 
philosophy should be ‘to show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle’ (Wittgenstein  1958 
[1953]: §309; see also Peterman (1992)). Best, Redfern and McFee also build on a 
number of Wittgenstein’s substantive insights: not just about clarification of complex, 
‘open’ and non-definable concepts, but also about the impossibility of a private language 
(for example, Best 1974a); and about the relationship between mind and body, intention 
and action, and the importance of refusing to understand that relationship as one which 
pits an inner, logically private, mental realm essentially against external and observable 
behaviour (Best 1974a; Redfern 1982 [1973]).  
 
4 Some choreography arguably also has resistive potential, embodying Foucauldian 
critique: William Forsythe’s work, for example, is examined by both Franko (2011) and 
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Hammond (2013) in Foucauldian terms as challenging the institution of ballet and 
hegemonic structures of the society in which it operates. 
 
5 Another source is New Criticism, particularly W. K. Wimsatt’s and Monroe C. 
Beardsley’s (1946) essay ‘The Intentional Fallacy’ (influential also on analytic 
philosophy of art; see Lamarque 2013). 
 
6 Although Pouillaude’s work generally comes from a continental philosophical 
perspective, he offers an extended critical commentary on Goodman (1976) and tackles a 
number of issues that are also topics of concern within the analytic ontological literature. 
 
7 This growth is evident in an increased number of symposia, conferences and 
publications: for example, panels and papers on philosophy of dance at the conferences of 
the American Society for Aesthetics and the British Society of Aesthetics; dedicated 
philosophy of dance conferences with an analytic presence held by various institutions 
(the universities of Brighton, Nancy, Roehampton, Ghent, Leeds and Texas State); and an 
expanded range of print and online publications on philosophy of dance (Beauquel and 
Pouivet 2010; Bunker, Pakes and Rowell 2013; Conroy and Van Camp 2013; McFee 
1999; see also Bresnahan 2015). Such work draws variously on earlier philosophical 
writing about dance, including Best, Carr and Redfern, but also Susanne Langer, Nelson 
Goodman, Joseph Margolis, Selma Jeanne Cohen, Julie Van Camp, Francis Sparshott, 
David Michael Levin, Roger Copeland and Curtis Carter. Already this suggests the 
trickiness of the label ‘analytic’, given the variety of reference points of these 
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philosophers (Cassirer’s symbolism, Pragmatism, Sartrean phenomenology and later 
Wittgensteinianism, for example). 
 
8 This misrepresents the position(s) of analytic philosophy. As discussed earlier, Best, 
Redfern and McFee all take issue with the idea that dance can be defined in terms of 
essential features; and in any case there is not much writing in this tradition which 
engages with the task of defining dance at all, although the literature on defining art is 
extensive (for an overview, see Adajian (2012)). This literature critiques and offers 
numerous alternatives to the kind of essentialist definition of art focused on manifest 
features that is also Cvejić’s target.  
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